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ADOLF 
				HITLER AND THE GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM 
				OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING 
				NOVEMBER 28, 1941  BERLIN, GERMANY 
  
				
				  
				 
				The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was probably the most famous and 
				most popular leader in the Arab world in his time.  His 
				enthusiastic and continued support for Hitler would have huge 
				implications for the future of the Middle East.  Yasir Arafat 
				began his career working for the Mufti after the war and would 
				continue to praise him as late as 2002. 
				Arafat's connection to the Mufti and the Mufti's high 
				prestige in the Arab world would create major concerns in the 
				world's Jewish community about the sincerity of the commitment 
				to peace of Arafat and other Arab leaders. 
Nazi Germany was admired by a large part of the Islamic world.  Even 
Anwar Sadat praised Hitler as late the 1950's.  Meanwhile, both Hitler and 
Himmler admired many aspects of Islam.   Here is
a report that gives more detail on the relationship 
between Nazi Germany and Islam.  (This does not in any suggest that we 
agree with the notion that Islam is form of fascism as promoted by many bigots 
in our time.) 
				The official transcript follows: 
 
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Reich Chancellory, Berlin November 28, 1941 meeting of German 
				Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseiniin 
				the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba 
				Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series 
				D, Vol XIII, London, 1964, pp.881 ff. 
				 
				GRAND MUFTI: 
				 
				The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Fuhrer for the great honor 
				he had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the 
				opportunity to convey to the Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich, 
				admired by the entire Arab world, his thanks of the sympathy 
				which he had always shown for the Arab and especially the 
				Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in 
				his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly convinced 
				that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would 
				then prosper. The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because 
				they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, 
				the Jews, and the Communists. Therefore they were prepared to 
				cooperate with Germany with all their hearts and stood ready to 
				participate in the war, not only negatively by the commission of 
				acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolutions, but also 
				positively by the formation of an Arab Legion. The Arabs could 
				be more useful to Germany as allies than might be apparent at 
				first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the 
				suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. 
				Furthermore, they had had close relations with all Moslem 
				nations, of which they could make use in behalf of the common 
				cause. The Arab Legion would be quite easy to raise. An appeal 
				by the Mufti to the Arab countries and the prisoners of Arab, 
				Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in Germany would 
				produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of 
				Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only 
				because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and 
				military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could 
				never award the victory to an unjust cause. 
				 
				In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence 
				and unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest 
				confidence in the Fuhrer and looked to his hand for the balm on 
				their wounds, which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies 
				of Germany. 
				 
				The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from 
				Germany, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab 
				territories and understood and recognized the aspirations to 
				independence and freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the 
				elimination of the Jewish national home. 
				 
				A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its 
				propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It 
				would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give 
				them new courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of 
				secretly organizing the Arabs against the moment when they could 
				strike. At the same time, he could give the assurance that the 
				Arabs would in strict discipline patiently wait for the right 
				moment and only strike upon an order form Berlin. 
				 
				With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the 
				Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited by 
				Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a 
				direct English assault upon their honor. 
				 
				The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an 
				Arab government in the neighboring territories because they 
				would prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the 
				neighboring countries and, being themselves a nations of 7 
				million, they had moreover nothing to fear from the 1,700,000 
				Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Palestine. 
				 
				France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan 
				because she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 
				and had given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria 
				under King Faisal as early as 1933. 
				 
				In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the 
				Fuhrer make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not 
				lose hope, which is so powerful a force in the life of nations. 
				With such hope in their hearts the Arabs, as he had said, were 
				willing to wait. They were not pressing for immediate 
				realization for their aspirations; they could easily wait half a 
				year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a 
				hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that 
				the English would be the gainers from it. 
				HITLER: 
				 
				The Fuhrer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these 
				questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. 
				Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That 
				naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home 
				in Palestine, which was nothing other than a center, in the form 
				of a state, for the exercise of destructive influence by Jewish 
				interests. Germany was also aware that the assertion that the 
				Jews were carrying out the functions of economic pioneers in 
				Palestine was a lie. The work there was done only by the Arabs, 
				not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step, to ask one 
				European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and 
				at the proper time to direct a similar appeal to non-European 
				nations as well. 
				 
				Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death 
				struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and 
				Soviet Russia. Theoretically there was a difference between 
				England's capitalism and Soviet Russia's communism; actually, 
				however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing a common goal. 
				This was the decisive struggle; on the political plane, it 
				presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and 
				England, but ideologically it was a battle between National 
				Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany 
				would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved 
				in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless in 
				a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to 
				mobilize all of England's power for their ends. 
				 
				The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how 
				little help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been 
				demonstrated plainly by the operation in Iraq, where 
				circumstances had not permitted the rendering of really 
				effective, practical aid. In spite of all the sympathies, German 
				aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome by the power 
				of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews. 
				 
				The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of 
				the struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of 
				the Arab world. The Fuhrer therefore had to think and speak 
				coolly and deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a 
				soldier, as the leader of the German and allied armies. 
				Everything of a nature to help in this titanic battle for the 
				common cause, and thus also for the Arabs, would have to be 
				done. Anything however, that might contribute to weakening the 
				military situation must be put aside, no matter how unpopular 
				this move might be. 
				 
				Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the 
				gateway to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were 
				mainly with regard to maintaining the supply, which was most 
				difficult as a result of the destruction of railroads and 
				highways as well as the oncoming winter. If at such a moment, 
				the Fuhrer were to raise the problem of Syria in a declaration, 
				those elements in France which were under de Gaulle's influence 
				would receive new strength. They would interpret the Fuhrer's 
				declaration as an intention to break up France's colonial empire 
				and appeal to their fellow countrymen that they should rather 
				make common cause with the English to try to save what still 
				could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria would in 
				France be understood to refer to the French colonies in general, 
				and that would at the present time create new troubles in 
				western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed 
				forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be 
				available for the campaign in the east. 
				 
				The Fuhrer then made the following statement to the Mufti, 
				enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart: 
				 
				1. He (the Fuhrer) would carry on the battle to the total 
				destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe. 
				2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but 
				which in any event was not distant, the German armies would in 
				the course of this struggle reach the southern exit from 
				Caucasia. 
				3. As soon as this had happened, the Fuhrer would on his own 
				give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation 
				had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the 
				destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere 
				under the protection of British power. In that hour the Mufti 
				would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. It 
				would then be his task to set off the Arab operations, which he 
				had secretly prepared. When that time had come, Germany could 
				also be indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration. 
				 
				Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through 
				Rostov; it would be also the beginning of the end of the British 
				World Empire. He (the Fuhrer) hoped that the coming year would 
				make it possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate 
				to the Middle East. For the good of their common cause, it would 
				be better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more 
				months than if Germany were to create difficulties for herself 
				without being able thereby to help the Arabs. 
				 
				He (the Fuhrer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for 
				a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. 
				But he would beg him to consider that he (the Fuhrer) himself 
				was the Chief of State of the German Reich for five long years 
				during which he was unable to make to his own homeland the 
				announcement of its liberation. He had to wait with that until 
				the announcement could be made on the basis of a situation 
				brought about by the force of arms that the Anschluss had been 
				carried out. 
				 
				The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had 
				made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal 
				requested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world. 
				GRAND MUFTI: 
				 
				The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything 
				would come to pass just as the Fuhrer had indicated. He was 
				fully reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard 
				form the Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether 
				it would not be possible, secretly at least, to enter into an 
				agreement with Germany of the kind he had just outlined for the 
				Fuhrer. 
				HITLER: 
				 
				The Fuhrer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti 
				precisely that confidential declaration. 
				GRAND MUFTI: 
				 
				The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that 
				he was taking his leave from the Fuhrer in full confidence and 
				with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause. 
				 
				 
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